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Nov.
Cleveland
of
ERR-PENNINGTON
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., 734 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 253 (1984).
ANTITRUST LAW: A

RESTRICTED APPLICATION OF THE

"SHAM"

I.

EXCEPTION-City

INTRODUCTION

The Noerr-Penningtondoctrine1 was created to protect certain activities2 that are designed to influence the passage and enforcement of
laws 3 from antitrust liability under the Sherman Act." By providing
such safeguards, the doctrine is intended to protect the first amendment
right to petition the government5--even though such activities may involve anticompetitive consequences.' The protection offered by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, however, is not absolute. Indeed, as is true of
most legal doctrines,
an exception has been carved out. The so-called
"sham" exception 7 to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides a means
to lift the shield of immunity in cases involving meritless petitioning
activities.8 Petitioning activities of this sort interfere with, and may
often create heavy burdens for, the party targeted for such action.9
1. See United Mineworkers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). See generally R. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978); Balmer, Sham Litigation and the
Antitrust Laws, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 39 (1980); Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L.
REV. 80 (1977); Oppenheim, Antitrust Immunity for Joint Efforts to Influence Adjudication
before Administrative Agencies and Courts-from Noerr-Pennington to Trucking Unlimited, 29
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 209 (1972); Note, Noerr-Pennington Immunity from Antitrust Liability
under Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc.: Replacing the Sham Exception with a Constitutional Analysis, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1305 (1984); Note, Limiting the
Antitrust Immunity for Concerted Attempts to Influence Courts and Adjudicatory Agencies:
Analogies to Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process, 86 HARV. L. REV. 715 (1973).
2. The term activities is used to refer generally to any attempts to influence any branch of
government. For example, a lobbying effort in a state legislature may be considered activity
designed to influence the passage of a law. Similarly, the filing of a lawsuit seeking an injunction
during a licensing procedure may also be considered activity designed to influence the enforcement
of a law. See Balmer, supra note 1, at 39-40.
3. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 135.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). The Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise" in restraint of trade and all attempts and conspiracies to monopolize. Id. §§ 1, 2.
5. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the
right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
6. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 669; Noerr, 365 U.S. at 139-40.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 39-44. See also Balmer, supra note I, at 41.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 39-44.
9. As noted by one commentator:
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Taken together, then, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and the "sham"
exception attempt to balance first amendment rights with the protections that the antitrust laws were designed to offer.10
Federal courts, when faced with allegations of antitrust violations
based on a defendant's use of governmental processes, must attempt to
balance the constitutional right to petition with the congressional mandate expressed in the antitrust laws." The controversy generally centers on whether the defendant's conduct involved a genuine petitioning
activity. When there is a legitimate effort to influence government action, the activity is protected by the guaranteed right to petition
through the application of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine. 2 When the
activity in question is not genuine petitioning activity, however, it falls
within the "sham" exception, and the antitrust laws continue to prohibit the violative conduct.' 3
In City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.," the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit followed a different approach in defining the "sham" exception. The court interpreted
the "sham" exception to require either repetitive, baseless claims or an
abuse of process."3 The court then focused its analysis on whether the
conduct fell within this exception and found that there was neither a
showing of clear abuse of process nor a repetitive and harassing filing

This mode of predation is particularly insidious because of its relatively low antitrust visibility. The enforcement agencies have been preoccupied with the mythical dangers of
mergers, vertical restraints, and price cutting. The fact that many battles fought before
agencies like local zoning boards are designed to preclude market entry does not come to
their attention. Since much of this predation occurs at local levels through misuse of state
and municipal procedures, the victims are often small businessmen with no, or very little,
idea of the possible protection afforded by antitrust laws.
R. BORK, supra note 1, at 348.
10. The objectives of the antitrust laws were well stated by Justice Black in Northern Pac.
Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). He stated:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed
at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise
that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our
economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of
our democratic political and social institutions.
Id. at 4.
11. See, e.g., MCI Communications Corp. v. AT & T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 234 (1983); Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc.,
690 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983); Landmarks Holding Corp. v.
Bermant, 664 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984).
12. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972). See
Balmer, supra note 1, at 39-40.
13. See Balmer, supra note 1, at 39-40.
14. 734 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 253 (1984).
15. Id. at 1162. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
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of claims. 6 In its analysis, the court made no attempt to determine
whether the alleged conduct was genuine petitioning activity. Consequently, the decision does not properly balance the first amendment
underpinnings of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine with the protection
from antitrust activity offered by the "sham" exception. Furthermore,
the circuit court's decision unnecessarily restricts the application of the
"sham" exception both substantively and procedurally. This casenote
will examine the court of appeal's decision in City of Cleveland by focusing primarily on the court's approach to the first amendment foundation of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine and the "sham" exception.
II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

In 1972, Charles Miller, backed by the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI), filed a taxpayer's lawsuit in the Court of Common Pleas for Cuyahoga County, Ohio. 17 Miller challenged a proposed
interconnection between the Municipal Electric Light Plant (Muny
Light, the city of Cleveland's utility company), and CEI. 18 The common pleas court granted a temporary restraining order to keep the city
from making any payments on work in progress for the interconnection
but did not enjoin the work itself. 9 Two weeks later, after hearings on
the matter, the court dissolved the order and refused to issue a permanent injunction. 0
Three years later, the city of Cleveland instituted an action against
CEI alleging a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act for monopolization and attempts to monopolize the Cleveland electric market." The
parties stipulated that CEI had induced Miller to file the taxpayer suit,
had never revealed its sponsorship of the litigation, -had paid Miller for
his troubles, and had provided him with expert testimony to back his
claim. The first trial on the antitrust claim ended in a hung jury but
the retrial resulted in a jury verdict for CEI 3
At the retrial, the city of Cleveland failed in its attempt to introduce the "Miller Stipulations" into evidence in order to demonstrate

16. City of Cleveland, 734 F.2d at 1162-63.
17. City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 734 F.2d 1157, 1161 (6th Cir.
1984).
18. Id. Muny Light was having problems with its generators which prevented it from supplying reliable service to its customers and sought CEI's cooperation to construct an interconnection enabling Muny to draw from CEI's generators. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.at 1160.
22. Id.at 1161. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals referred to these stipulations as the
"Miller Stipulations." Id.
23. Id. at 1160.
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CEI's anticompetitive intent to exclude Muny Light from the retail
electric power market. 24 Based on the rationale of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the trial court held the stipulations to be inadmissible.2 5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision. The court of appeals held that in the
absence of clear abuse of process or' the repetitive and harassing filing
of meritless claims, it could not find that the trial judge acted erroneously in holding the "Miller Stipulations" inadmissible. 6
III.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine and the First Amendment

The Noerr-Penningtondoctrine evolved from a trilogy of United
States Supreme Court cases. The seminal case in this evolution is
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.2"
There the Supreme Court established the position that the Sherman
Act does not apply to those activities which comprise mere solicitation
of governmental action with respect to the passage and enforcement of
laws. 29 The Supreme Court determined that holding that the Sherman

24. Id. at 1161-62. "The stipulations were admitted at the first trial, but only as rebuttal
evidence after witnesses for Cleveland Electric had testified that Cleveland Electric had done
nothing to interfere with the interconnection. At the second trial, defense counsel was wise enough
not to make the same mistake twice." Id. at 1161 n.4.
25. Id. at 1161-62.
26. Id. at 1163. The court also held that it was in the broad discretion of the district court
to hold that the collateral estoppel effect should not be applied to antitrust findings made by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's licensing board in connection with CEI's applications to build
nuclear power plants. The court of appeals based its decision on a finding that different procedures
and burdens of proof were used in the administrative proceeding than were used in the district
court, that irregular circumstances surrounded the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's decision,
and that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's decision was not a final judgment. Id. at 1165-66.
In his dissent, Judge Martin disagreed with each of the majority's conclusions and stated that
"because I do not believe that giving collateral estoppel effect to the Commission's findings of fact
would 'contravene public policy or result in manifest injustice,' I would give collateral estoppel
effect to the Commission's findings of fact." Id. at 1172. The court also ruled on six other issues
which were raised on appeal, but those issues are beyond the scope of this casenote.
27. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
28. 365 U.S. 127. In Noerr, a group of truck operators and its trade association sued under
§ 4 of the Clayton Act for treble damages and injunctive relief against a group of railroads, a
public relations firm, and a railroad association, alleging that the defendants had conspired to
restrain trade in, and monopolize, the long-distance freight business in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act. Id. at 129. The truckers charged that the defendants conducted a publicity
campaign aimed at influencing the passage of legislation which would benefit the railroads and
eliminate the truckers as competitors. Id. at 129-30.
29. Id. at 137-38. While most courts addressing this decision agree that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is intended to protect first amendment rights, some courts have stated that the
Noerr decision was an exercise in statutory construction. "Noerr expressly refrains from deciding
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Act forbids associations for the purpose of influencing the passage or
enforcement of laws would substantially impair the power of government-through its legislature and executive-to take actions that operate to restrain trade.3 0 The Court noted that it was at least equally
significant that such a construction of the Sherman Act would raise
important constitutional questions. 3' Indeed, the right of petition is protected by the Bill of Rights and the Court would not lightly impute to
Congress an intent to evade such freedoms.3 2
In United Mine Workers v. Pennington,3 the Supreme Court extended first amendment protection to efforts to influence the executive
branch. 34 In reaching its decision the Court held that regardless of intent or purpose, concerted efforts to influence public officials are
shielded from the Sherman Act under Noerr's protective umbrella.3 5
The Court stated that efforts to influence public officials, though intended to eliminate competition, do not violate the antitrust laws."
Finally, in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,37 the Supreme Court held that the right to petition the government includes all three branches of government. 38 The Court made it

whether the activities complained of are protected under the first amendment." Suburban Restoration Co. v. ACMAT Corp., 700 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 1983). "The Noerr holding was, strictly
speaking, a matter of statutory construction, but First Amendment concerns clearly informed the
decision." Litton Systems, Inc. v. American AT & T Co., 700 F.2d 785, 805 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied. 104 S. Ct. 984 (1984).
30. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137. Governmental bodies often enact legislation which serves to
both regulate and, at times, restrain trade. Therefore, to act in this representative capacity the
government needs to be freely informed by the people. Id.
31. Id. at 138.
32. Id. Justice Black, delivering the opinion for the Court, stated:
In a representative democracy such as this, these branches of government act on behalf of
the people and, to a very large extent, the whole concept of representation depends upon
the ability of the people to make their wishes known to their representatives. To hold that
the government retains the power to act in this representative capacity and yet hold, at the
same time, that the people cannot freely inform the government of their wishes would
impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but political activity, a purpose which would have no basis whatever in the legislative history of that Act.
Id.
33. 381 U.S. 657 (1965). The conduct challenged, inter alia, was efforts by the United
Mine Workers and large operators who allegedly agreed to eliminate smaller companies by obtaining from the secretary of labor the establishment of a minimum wage (under the WalshHealey Act) higher than that established for other industries. Id.
34. Id. at 670.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 404 U.S. 508. A group of truck operators was charged with conspiring to monopolize
trade and commerce by taking concerted actions to institute state and federal proceedings to resist
and defeat applications by competitors to acquire operating rights or to transfer or register those
rights. Id. at 509.
38. Id. at 510-I1.
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clear that the first amendment rights of petition and association underlie the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, and those rights extend to attempts
to influence all three branches of government, including administrative
agencies. n9 The Court concluded that it would be destructive of the
rights of association and petition to hold that groups could not use the
channels and procedures of administrative agencies and courts to advocate their causes without violating the antitrust laws.'0
B.

The "Sham" Exception

The "sham" exception, as enunciated in Noerr,'1 reflects a recognition that not all efforts to influence a branch of government are necessarily genuine efforts to petition the government. 42 In CaliforniaMotor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,'3 the United States Supreme
Court amplified the "sham" exception, making it clear that when first
amendment rights are used as an integral part of conduct which violates a valid statute there is no guarantee of immunity."
While not specifically addressing the "sham" exception, the Supreme Court, in United Mine Workers v. Pennington,'5 determined
that under certain circumstances, evidence of conduct protected by the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine may still be admitted at a trial.' These
three cases make it clear that under the proper circumstances, certain
petitioning activities falling within the "sham" exception to the Noerr-

39.
40.

Id. at 510.
Id. at 510-11. In discussing its reasoning in Noerr and Pennington the Court stated

that:
The same philosophy governs the approach of citizens or groups of them to administrative
agencies (which are both creatures of the legislature, and arms of the executive) and to the
courts, the third branch of Government. Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of
the right to petition.
Id. at 510.
41. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144. "There may be situations in which a publicity campaign ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually
nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor
and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified." Id.
42. See Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240,
1255 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983).
43. 404 U.S. 508.
44. Id. at 514.
45. 381 U.S. 657.
46. Id. at 669-70. The Court stated:
It would of course still be within the province of the trial judge to admit this evidence, if he
deemed it probative and not unduly prejudicial, under the "established judicial rule of
evidence that testimony of prior or subsequent transactions, which for some reason are
barred from forming the basis for a suit, may nevertheless be introduced if it tends reasonably to show the purpose and character of the particular transactions under scrutiny."
Id. at 670 n.3 (citations omitted).
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Pennington doctrine may either be violative of the antitrust laws or be
admissible at a trial to show the purpose and character of the particular transactions under scrutiny.

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

An Unbalanced Approach

In City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.,4 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit failed to consider
CEI's conduct within the context of the underlying principle of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine. This failure is evidenced by the absence of any
substantive discussion of the first amendment right to petition.4 8 The
right to petition4 9 underlies the protections afforded by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Nevertheless, the court of appeals neglected to discuss
how CEI's clandestine involvement in the Miller suit created a need for
such protection. The court's avoidance of any attempt to describe CEI's
unethical behavior as petitioning activity legitimately in need of first
amendment protection is understandable. Justifying CEI's involvement
in the Miller suit as legitimate petitioning activity would have been
particularly difficult in light of the Supreme Court's discussion in Bill
Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB 50 regarding the scope of the first
amendment right to petition.
In Bill Johnson's Restaurants, the United States Supreme Court
espoused one commentator's observation that:
The first amendment interests involved in private litigation - compensation for violated rights and interests, the psychological benefits of vindication, public airing of disputed facts-are not advanced when the litigation is based on intentional falsehoods or on knowingly frivolous claims.
Furthermore, since sham litigation by definition does not involve a bona
fide grievance, it does not come within the first amendment right to
petition."'

None of the first amendment interests suggested in Bill Johnson's Restaurants were advanced by CEI promoting the improper suit brought
by Miller. There was no attempt by CEI to pursue compensation for
47. 734 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 253 (1984).
48. It is interesting to note that the majority opinion only twice mentions first amendment
rights. First amendment rights were mentioned once in a sentence briefly explaining Noerr-Pennington and once in a quote from another court. Id. at 1162-63. In California Motor Transp. Co.
v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) (relied on heavily by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in City of Cleveland) the opinion is replete with references to the first amendment and
the right to petition. Id.
49. See supra note 5.
50. 103 S. Ct. 2161 (1983).
51. Id. at 2170 (quoting Balmer, supra note I, at 60).
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violated rights and interests. Rather, CEI was attempting to interfere
with the city's right to the interconnection as ordered by the Federal
Power Commission. If any psychological benefits were to be had they
were the psychological benefits derived from harassing a competitor,
not benefits derived from vindication. Moreover, the concealment of
CEI's involvement in the suit can hardly be considered an interest in a
public airing of disputed facts. Finally, there was never a bona fide
grievance on the part of CEI.
In short, based upon what the Supreme Court believes to be legitimate first amendment interests in the right to petition, the Miller suit
did not directly or vicariously present any interests of CEI which could
legitimately claim first amendment protection under Noerr-Pennington.
Thus, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals takes an unbalanced approach to its analysis of the Miller suit (under Noerr-Pennington) by
leaving unsubstantiated the premise that CEI's involvement was legitimate petitioning activity. Rather, the court adopted a restrictive interpretation of the "sham" exception to legitimize the premise that the
Miller suit was not "sham" litigation.
B.

A Restrictive Interpretationof Sham Litigation

The characterization of "sham" litigation espoused by the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals was extracted from the United States Supreme Court's opinion in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited.52 The court of appeals failed, however, to consider other,
less restrictive language found in the same opinion.5" In so doing, the
court narrowed the application of the "sham" exception to two situations-when there is a showing of baseless, repetitive claims or when
54
there is a showing of abuse of process.
By requiring repetitive claims, a single lawsuit, no matter how
meritless or fraudulent, can never be found to be a "sham" unless it
results in an abuse of process. The Sixth Circuit fashioned this requirement from a narrow reading of dictum found in the California Motor
opinion. 55 The Supreme Court, in CaliforniaMotor, described forms of
illegal and reprehensible practices that may corrupt the administrative
or judicial processes. 56 Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit restricted the
concept of "sham" litigation to a showing of abuse of process or repeti-

52. 404 U.S. 508.
53. See infra notes 57 & 58 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note II and accompanying text.
55. California Motor, 404 U.S. at 512-13.
56. Id. Examples were perjury of witnesses, use of a patent obtained by fraud to exclude a
competitor from the market, conspiracy with a licensing authority to eliminate a competitor, and
bribery of a public purchasing agent. Id.
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tive, meritless claims.
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit questioned whether a single lawsuit, even if found meritless, may be considered to be within the
"sham" exception. 7 Notwithstanding the court's reluctance to answer
this question, a growing number of courts are recognizing that, in some
instances, one lawsuit can be sufficient to come within the Noerr-Pennington's "sham" exception.5 8 As Judge Kane so aptly stated in Colorado Petroleum Marketers Association v. Southland Corp.:" "I am
not convinced that the court intended to give every dog one free bite,
thus making it an irrebutable presumption that the first lawsuit was not
a sham regardless of overwhelming evidence indicating otherwise."6
It is fair to suggest that the Sixth Circuit did not intend to give
every dog one free bite. Nevertheless, the court offered little protection
from a Miller-style attack through its requirement of a showing of
clear abuse of process, absent evidence of repetitive, baseless claims.
This obviously is a critical issue (as it was to the city of Cleveland)
where only one lawsuit is involved. Since the city of Cleveland could
not show evidence of more than one suit, its only opportunity to prove a
"sham" was to prove an abuse of process by Cleveland Electric.
The Sixth Circuit stated that there was no indication of a finding
by the state court that initiation of the Miller suit was an abuse of
process."' This remark must be considered obiter dictum. If the Sixth
Circuit is requiring a finding by a state court of abuse of process, then
activities which would otherwise be an abuse of process will not be considered as such if undiscovered by the state tribunal. Such a position
would be untenable.6 It would be tantamount to requiring that an antitrust plaintiff first successfully prosecute an abuse of process claim in
the state court, before that plaintiff may bring an antitrust action in
federal court, where a single act of "sham" litigation is being alleged.

57. City of Cleveland, 734 F.2d at 1162-63.
58. E.g., Energy Conservation, Inc. v. Heliodyne, Inc., 698 F.2d 386, 388 (9th Cir. 1983)
(quoting Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1255
(9th Cir. 1982) ("'[I]t
is unnecessary to allege and prove more than the institution of a single suit
or protest to invoke the sham exception.' "), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983)); MCI Communications Corp. v. AT & T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1155 (7th Cir. 1983) ("We therefore find that the
bringing of baseless claims-even the undertaking of a single sham state court lawsuit-is devoid
of the constitutional significance that warrants immunity from the antitrust laws."); Feminists
Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 543 n.6 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Absent clear
direction from the Supreme Court, we see no reason for erecting a special, high burden of proof
on this issue."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
59. 476 F. Supp. 373 (D. Colo. 1979).
60. Id. at 378.
61. City of Cleveland, 734 F.2d at 1162.
62. One commentator suggests that the analogy of sham litigation to abuse of process
should be applied cautiously. See Balmer, supra note 1, at 68-69.
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Certainly it is within the purview of a federal district court to find that
an abuse of process has occurred without a prior ruling by a state
tribunal.
Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the Miller suit was not
an abuse of process. Showing an abuse of process from facts such as
that of the Miller suit would be difficult, if not impossible. The two
elements generally considered to be essential to a finding of abuse of
process are "first, an ulterior purpose and second, a willful act in the
use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. ' 6 3 As applied to Miller's activities in promoting the taxpayer suit,
it is speculative whether Miller fulfilled both of the requisite elements
of the tort. Charles Miller may have had an ulterior purpose, namely
that of cooperating with CEI and collecting a fee, having little or no
interest in the outcome of the suit. However, Miller did nothing in the
use of the process which was improper in the regular conduct of the
proceeding. In other words, the suit may have been brought with an
ulterior purpose, but Miller did nothing improper as the action proceeded to its final disposition. Therefore, the second element required
for a showing of abuse of process is not present.
Ultimately, this failure to show an abuse of process on the part of
Charles Miller also serves to protect CEI. CEI receives this protection
from the Sixth Circuit's position that to show "sham" litigation in a
single lawsuit, an abuse of process must be shown. With this position,
however, the court loses sight of the fact that since CEI itself could not
have properly brought the suit, its involvement with Miller did not involve legitimate petitioning activity. In brief, the court's requirement of
a showing of repetitive, meritless suits, or a showing of clear abuse of
process, creates a situation in which unethical conduct, such as that of
CEI, receives unwarranted immunity from antitrust liability under the
Noerr-Penningtondoctrine.
C.

The Evidentiary Restriction

The Sixth Circuit in City of Cleveland refused to allow the city to
introduce evidence of the Miller suit. The city wanted to show the anticompetitive character and nature of CEI's conduct as a part of the
64
alleged broader pattern of conduct condemned by the Sherman Act.
The court believed that the trial judge was acting within his discretion
when he excluded the evidence because of the danger of unfair

63. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 121, at 898 (5th ed. 1984).
64.

City of Cleveland, 734 F.2d at 1163.
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prejudice and of confusing or misleading the jury.6 5 Moreover, the
court believed the evidence was cumulative and its impact insubstantial. 6 The court also stated that the admission of evidence pertaining to
the Miller suit, even for the limited purpose of rebutting testimony of
one of CEI's witnesses, would expose the jury to the danger of considering that proof for improper purposes-"that of an anti-competitive
act when it was not admissible for that purpose." ' a7
In his dissent, Judge Martin argued vigorously that the district
court erred in excluding the Miller stipulations from evidence. 8 Martin
relied on the proposition, stated in Pennington, that acts which are not
in themselves actionable under the antitrust laws nonetheless can be
admitted into evidence if "probative and not unduly prejudicial." 6 9 He
pointed out that the Miller stipulations went to the heart of the issue of
whether CEI's means were unfair or unreasonable.7 0 Judge Martin believed that was of heightened importance because the jury was being
told that CEI was trying its best to comply with the Federal Power
Commission's order to interconnect with the city. 7 1
Furthermore, Judge Martin charged that the trial judge failed to
weigh prejudice as it is normally considered in an evidentiary setting. 2
He asserted that the question was whether admission of the evidence
would inflame the jury's passions against the defendant or otherwise
cause the jury to decide the case on a basis unrelated to the merits; the
issue was not whether the admission of the evidence would prejudice
73
CEI's first amendment rights.
The applicable rule of evidence providing for exclusion of relevant
evidence, 74 and the weight of authority, both clearly support Judge
Martin's position. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that relevant
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.7 Rule 403, by requiring the

65. Id.
66. Id. at 1164.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1170-71 (Martin, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 1170 (quoting United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 n.3
(1965)).
70. City of Cleveland, 734 F.2d at 1171.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. The applicable rule provides "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403. See also Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961 (3d Cir.
1980).
75. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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danger of unfair prejudice to substantially outweigh the probative
value of the evidence, supports the well settled presupposition of admissibility of relevant evidence. 76 The trial court inverted the rule by requiring the probative value of the evidence to outweigh the likely prejudicial effect. Consequently, the requirement that the probative value be
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice is effectively eliminated. Therefore, in addition to taking an unbalanced approach to its analysis of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and restricting
the substantive application of the "sham" exception, the court has also
restricted the evidentiary application of the exception provided for in
Pennington.
V.

CONCLUSION

77
In City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit emasculated the
application of the "sham" exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
Through its unbalanced approach, the court failed to consider whether
CEI's conduct was genuine petitioning activity. By requiring either repetitive claims or a showing of abuse of process, the court adopted a
restrictive interpretation of "sham" litigation. Finally, through its evidentiary restriction, the court effectively negated the evidentiary provision of Pennington. As suggested by the dissent, considering the long
history of the proceedings, there is room to sympathize with the court
in its decision to uphold the trial judge's rulings and dispose of the case
once and for all.78 However, the perceived attitude of the court towards
"sham" litigation will have possible consequences beyond the immediate impact of the decision on the parties involved.
Within the context of large corporate entities, the filing of one
meritless lawsuit may not result in any great harm to the defendant.
Within the context of a smaller business, however, litigation expenses
can become particularly burdensome. While it is impossible to determine the overall effect of abuse of governmental processes on competition, the rising number of lawsuits in this area of litigation suggests
79
that this form of predation may be more common than is suspected.
While first amendment rights are at the pinnacle of constitutional
values, predation through the governmental processes should not be immunized from antitrust liability when no legitimate petitioning activity
is found. Defendants in such cases should not be permitted to wrap

76.
77.
78.
79.

FED. R. EviD. 402.

734 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 253 (1984).
Id. at 1170 (Martin, J., dissenting).
See R. BORK, supra note 1, at 348-49.
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themselves in the blanket of protection offered by Noerr-Penningtonto
legitimate attempts to petition the government. Therefore, the Sixth
Circuit in City of Cleveland, must be criticized to the extent its decision suggests that unscrupulous tactics, such as CEI's, which are undeserving of first amendment protection, may be protected from antitrust
liability.
Glen E. Hazen, Jr.
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